Ambiguously Disgruntled Manifesto

wasting your time since 1975

1/07/2010

What if I told you the Sounders played a 5-4-1?

Before you shout me down for being insane, let me take a minute to explain what's going on here. In this interminably long Sounders off-season, I have taken to becoming obsessed with formations. I have helped bide the time by reading the genius that is Jonathan Wilson and following a couple local blogs like Dave Clark's stuff over at Sounder at Heart, and while I wait for Amazon to deliver "Inverting the Pyramid" I figured I'd re-launch the blog by sharing some thoughts.

Before we begin, I guess I also need to point out that, in the end, debating formations is almost entirely useless. You can go only so far before it descends into semantics and the realization that there are really 10 unique outfield positions in soccer-football, and formations only apply to how a match reporter relates the lineup to the viewer/reader. As JW says, "formations are neutral." Only when combined with personnel and tactics can we derive any meaning from any of it.

So, this leads me to the obvious realization that such a quixotic topic is absolutely perfect for me to relaunch the blog. And away we go.

3 1/2 years ago, blogging after the '06 World Cup, I blasted the trend of the 4-5-1, and it occurs to me now this take was shockingly naive. Both of the finalists, France and Italy, employed the 4-5-1, which at the time I felt put too much pressure on the lone striker, and I dismissed as typically, mindlessly conservative for elite football. What I didn't appreciate then, as I do now, was the importance of attacking fullbacks (which is to say the outside defenders). In fact, the marauding fullbacks very well may have been the signature of World Cup '06, and both Italy and France made great use of this. It was clearly no longer just a Brazilian trait.

Looking beyond that, behind the strikers, Henry for France and Toni for Italy, there was a bank of extremely talented attacking players lined up at nominal midfield positions. Focusing on France, from left to right, were Malouda, Zidane, and Ribery, all gifted players who demonstrated their attacking chops before, during, or after the tournament. Of course, Zidane was the player of the tournament, and there isn't too much I really need to say to qualify his prowess as a player. On the nominal right was Ribery, who was a revelation of the tournament. Here was a player who attacked from the right, not so much a right wing or midfield in the traditional sense. Behind these three was Viera, more of a "box-to-box" midfielder, and lined up as an "upback," or holding midfield, was Makele.

Makele may have been the player of the decade, not because he was the best, or even the most impactful, but because he helped introduce us all to the idea that there was a primarily defensive player, ostensibly a midfielder, who could babysit for all the other midfielders rushing forward to attack. The "deep lying midfielder" has become so ubiquitous in football we all take it for granted, and rarely pause to wonder if, and how, this may mean, that combined with fullbacks interested in attacking, contemporary defenses may be 5 players split into two banks: two center defenders as the back bank of 2, then a holding midfielder in front of them, and the two fullbacks -- the bank of three. In fact, many teams now are using two holding midfield players, creating a bank of 2 in front of the back 4, finding it useful to have two babysitters, not only for midfielders pushing forward, but fullbacks as well.

I don't wish to spend too much time on the "4-bank" nature of current formations. Just know that in most cases, the old 4-4-2 has become a 4-2-3-1, I'll refer you to Jonathan Wilson for more detail on that.

Ultimately, I want to talk about the Sounders. They don't use a 4-2-3-1, necessarily. There are various ways to describe their formation, and Dave Clark has come up with a good one, which he calls "Sigi's Arrow." There are a couple important things to take note of in "Sigi's arrow." The first is that the middle consists of a line of 4 players: the holding midfield, Alsonso; a "linking" (box to box) midfielder, Evans or Vagenas; the "playmaker/supporter striker," at various times Ljungberg or Montero; and the top or center forward, most often Jaqua (until late in the season). The second is that hidden in this is what appears to be a diamond midfield. To explain this, let's start from the back. In front of the back 4 (2 centerbacks and the fullbacks) is Alsono "holding." Then in front of him is a diamond, with the "box-to-box" midfielder at the back, Zakuani on the left, the supporting striker up top, and then a nominal right midfielder. Up top is the "lone striker" who is far from alone.

To really understand this, we should take a closer look at Zakuani. Stevey Z made a living as a striker playing for Akron University, one of the top teams in the NCAA, and lead the nation in scoring his senior year. One could rightfully say he made the "adjustment" to playing left mid at the MLS level for the Sounders. We already know it isn't a stretch to have elite goal-scorers play from the outside midfield: Christiano Ronaldo scored 42 goals for Manchester United in 07-08 as they won the EPL/Camps. Lge. double, and he played mainly as a right midfielder or winger. But thinking of this type of player as a right mid or wing belies the greater truth, and we know this from watching Stevey Z. perform this season. Just like Ribery for France in '06, or USA international Clint Dempsey for Fulham, these are not players who perform on the wing, shuttling up and down the side and booming crosses. Instead, these are players who start from the wing, but are primarily going to go move toward pressure, rather than avoid it, which is to say they are going to attack the goal.

At some point, the entire discussion of football formations and tactics becomes about creating angles and space. This is no different than many other sports, as anybody who watches basketball or hockey should be familiar with this. Even contemporary tackle-football formations and tactics have become obsessed with these notions, as modern passing offenses have replaced old-school "3 yards and a cloud of dust" even down to the high school level. How we relate this to what Stevey Z. does is by thinking of the left wing or mid position as the spot where the attack commences, taking advantage of the spacing and angles available. He's not out there to get back and play defense -- there are people to "babysit" him for that (this is overlooking the fact that defense is played every bit as much up high as in back) -- and he's not out there to shuttle up and down the wing and hit crosses. The Sounders don't play a "huck it up the side and cross it" game. They play short passes, diagonal runs; in short they play to try to take advantage of angles and spaces.

I'm not claiming to be revelatory here. All I've done with the last paragraph here is explain widely-known, fundamental football tactics which have been around for generations. The whole point of this exercise is to explain why/how the Sounders play a 5-4-1, and why that isn't "defensive." In fact, I'm not even claiming they do play a 5-4-1, in the case you're confused, I refer you back to the 4th paragraph...

At any rate. As the Sounders progressed through their season, their back 4 was set, Alonso was set at the holding spot, Zakuani owned the spot on the left (at least starting) and we knew the attack was going to include Jaqua, Montero, and Ljungberg in some capacity. Evans started out strong, lost his way during and after his mid-summer USA callup, and eventually returned to "linking" midfield. In the interim, much to the chagrin of many supporters, we saw Vagenas play there often. We saw Evans on the right at times, which in my opinion never really worked, because he wasn't the type of player who could exploit what that position called for. It worked quite well with Ljungberg on the nominal right for a while, but the fact is the spot shuffled all season. Towards the end of the year, it became clear the spot was left over for whoever among Ljungberg, Montero, and Jaqua (or subs Le Toux and Levesque) was there to fill it. Late in the season, we saw lineups with Jaqua listed as the "nominal right," but I clearly recall even during those matches seeing him return to the top forward, and either Montero or Ljungberg working from the right. With Evans at the "link," I think Ljungberg flourished at the top of the diamond -- the playmaker/supporting striker -- and we really saw some good things. Given the freedom that role provides, Ljungberg created some great goals from wide positions late in the year (and if a centrally located player providing from wide throws you off, I remind you to check paragraph 4 again). Montero could be brilliant from the nominal right, if, as Dave Clark says, "he didn't do 27 step-overs when he had space."

To get back to the original point. You could say the Sounders don't employ a 4-2-3-1, but instead a 4-1-4-1, but not a flat 4 in the middle, so its really a 4-1-diamond-1. Now, going back to what I said earlier re: the 5-man, two bank defense. Voila, a 5-4-1...

Of course, why stop there. what about calling it a 2-3-1-2-1-1? Or 2-3-1-3-1? In which case, I again urge you to re-read paragraph 4...

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2 Comments:

At 1/8/10 7:48 PM , Blogger Linda Reeder said...

I can't begin to follow this. Maybe a diagram would help. What I am taking from it is the Sounders use an attacking formation rather than a defensive formation, with flexibility for play making from the interior of the field.
How's that for a start?

 
At 1/9/10 12:07 AM , Blogger Jake said...

http://www.sounderatheart.com/2010/1/6/1237785/more-on-sigis-arrow#storyjump

The lesson is formations can be deceiving, and lining up with one true forward doesn't indicate a team is playing conservatively. The Sounders are one of many teams that employ gifted attacking players in more withdrawn, midfield positions.

 

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